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1. The argument against evidentialism and for norm-reasons 
 
It has been argued by Clayton Littlejohn that our epistemic reasons transcend our 
evidence.1 More precisely, the claim is that our normative epistemic reasons that bear 
on whether to believe are not exhausted by the body of evidence that we possess. (Here 
we follow Littlejohn in putting pragmatic reasons for belief aside.) These epistemic 
reasons are normative because they determine or contribute to the determination of 
what we ought to believe or which beliefs are appropriate or correct to hold; the deontic status of doxastic attitudes is at stake. Call this ‘negative’ thesis the ‘evidence 
transcendence thesis’ about epistemic reasons (ETT, for short). In other words, ETT is the denial of the ‘Reasons-Evidence Identification Thesis’ (REI). 
 
 (REI) X is an epistemic reason (i.e., something that bears on whether to believe) 
  iff X is a piece of evidence. (Littlejohn 2018: 531) 
 
The argument is highly relevant to the truth of evidentialism, since understood in a 
natural way, evidentialism is the claim that our epistemic reasons do not transcend our 
evidence (or so it seems). In other words, according to evidentialism, what doxastic 
attitude we ought to take is given by our evidence and nothing but our evidence. 
                                                        
1 The most recent and detailed formulation can be found in Littlejohn (2018). A short 
version is given in Littlejohn (2012), p. 223. A slightly different formulation (that refers 
to reasons that “determine whether a belief is justified” instead of reasons that bear on 
whether to believe, as in REI) can be found in Littlejohn (2017), sc. 5. There, Littlejohn 
acknowledges that he owes the point to Owens (2000). 
 What else could provide (normative) epistemic reasons? – Clayton Littlejohn’s 
proposal is that it could be an epistemic norm or epistemic norms. So the positive claim – that complements the ‘negative’ ETT – is that there are norm-reasons, reasons that do 
not derive from (and are not identical to) one’s evidence but come from an epistemic 
norm. Following Littlejohn we can take the relevant norm to be the following: 
 
(EN) You should not believe p without sufficient evidence. 
 
Now, for the subject in the case of insufficient evidence  
 
 there’s a decisive reason to refrain from believing p (…). This reason is not a 
 further piece of evidence, but it’s a reason that bears on whether to believe p. (…) 
 If there are norms like EN that govern belief, we should recognize the distinction 
 between evidential reasons from norm-reasons. The former are pieces of 
 evidence and the latter are provided by norms like EN. (Littlejohn 2018: 539-40) 
 Let us call this ‘positive’ claim that norms like EN provide reasons of their own the ‘norm-reasons thesis’ (NRT, for short). 
 The crucial argument for the NRT is provided by cases of insufficient evidence. 
If one has sufficient evidence for p, believing p is what one ought to do. But if one lacks 
sufficient evidence for p, what is it that one ought to do doxastically? Intuitively, it is 
argued, we ought not to believe p (nor ought we to believe its negation). Call this the ‘primary intuition’ about cases of insufficient evidence. Now we can ask, if in this case 
there is any evidence for not believing p? Intuitively, it is clear that this need not be the 
case, and therefore the subject could have an epistemic reason which is not a piece of 
evidence (since if one ought not to believe p, one has an epistemic reason not to believe 
p). Even if we have no evidence for not believing p, this is what we have epistemic 
reason to do – not believe p. (We want to leave it open whether the notion of ‘evidence for not believing’ makes sense. If it doesn’t, there couldn’t be any such evidence; if it 
does, there needn’t be such evidence.) 
 Littlejohn draws the conclusion that if we accept the primary intuition about 
cases of insufficient evidence, we should also accept a distinction between what he calls ‘evidential-reasons’ and ‘norm-reasons’. Pieces of evidence are evidential-reasons. A 
norm-reason is a reason for a certain doxastic attitude which comes from a norm that 
one is subject to, and not from a bit of evidence one possesses. If one lacks sufficient 
evidence, one is subject to EN and thereby has epistemic reason not to believe p. This is 
a norm-reason, and so not all epistemic reasons that bear on whether to believe are 
pieces of evidence. In other words, one has an epistemic reason not to believe p but ‘this 
is not just a further bit of evidence’, as Littlejohn puts it (Littlejohn 2012, n. 1). 




2. In defence of evidentialism 
 
The case of insufficient evidence does not provide any argument against evidentialism, we submit. Littlejohn’s argument concerning insufficient evidence may or may not lead to acknowledging norms as ‘something that bears on whether to believe’, i.e., norm-
reasons. But it does not show that evidentialism would be wrong. In what follows we 
distinguish two responses on behalf of the evidentialist. 
According to the conciliatory response, an evidentialist can accept that there is a 
norm covering belief (and other attitudes) and that this norm bears on whether to 
believe, in a way different from how pieces of evidence bear on this question. The 
relevant norm may be the one that Feldman and Conee have described it in their classic paper “Evidentialism”: 
 
 (FCE) [O]ne epistemically ought to have the doxastic attitudes that fit one’s  
  evidence. (Feldman, Conee 1985: 19) 
 
The evidentialist can say that what determines whether we are to believe a certain 
proposition are two things: pieces of evidence and the general ought expressed by the 
norm (FCE). This norm contributes to the explanation of particular oughts that believers 
are subject to, for example, the believer in the case of insufficient evidence. Coming back to this case, we can say that the subject’s body of evidence provides insufficient epistemic reason for believing p. One’s body of evidence bears on whether to believe p, 
of course. But what also bears on whether to believe p is the norm, i.e., the fact that one 
ought to have the doxastic attitudes that fit one’s evidence. Understood thusly, the norm 
also provides an epistemic reason. But it should be noted that the case of sufficient evidence is no different from the case of insufficient evidence in this respect. One’s 
pieces of evidence – evidential reasons – determine that one ought to believe p when 
subject to the norm FCE. In other words, what fully explains that the subject which 
possesses sufficient evidence for p ought to believe p is not only the particular first-level 
bits of evidence in her possession but also, in addition, the norm (i.e., something on a 
higher level, not on a par with ordinary first-order facts). And this is so whether we are 
dealing with insufficient or sufficient evidence. Focusing on the case of insufficient 
evidence, thus, is misleading. 
According to this conciliatory response, evidentialists have no reason to deny the 
existence of norm-reasons if ‘epistemic reasons’ are defined as things that bear on 
whether to believe. Indeed, evidentialists have put forward their own proposal about 
what the right norm is. They are not committed to REI, and they can accept the evidence 
transcendence thesis, ETT. Plausible as it may initially seem, evidentialism should not be 
identified with REI or anything that entails REI. According to evidentialism, what 
attitudes one is to take is determined by the norm and by one’s pieces of evidence.  
There is, however, a different, more conservative response, which disputes Littlejohn’s argument for the introduction of norm-reasons and ends up defending the 
original evidentialist position according to which the realm of epistemic reasons is 
exhausted by our evidence (REI). Evidentialist will claim that what one ought to believe is determined by one’s epistemic reasons. If they are right, a normative fact, like that S 
ought to believe that p, is itself a consequence of which reasons apply in a situation: the 
epistemic ought is determined by epistemic reasons. If this is the right way to think 
about ought – as being determined by epistemic reasons – it cannot itself be a source of 
any additional reasons. And if evidence alone determines what one ought to believe, there won’t be norm-reasons arising from what is thus determined. Do we, then, have 
reason not to believe that p when there is insufficient evidence for this belief? Yes, we 
do, and the reason is evidential in the same sense as all reasons are. If there is no reason 
which favours believing p over believing not-p, we should withhold and, thus, not 
believe that p. Withholding is an epistemic attitude which may, on occasion, best fit one’s evidence. The question what is the reason for withholding will be answered by 
pointing to the evidential situation as a whole. (When we say, as we often do, that one 
piece of evidence is the reason for believing that p, we pick out a salient feature of our 
evidential situation. However, all the reasons in play determine collectively what the 
epistemically appropriate response will be. This holds in the same way for believing and 
withholding.)  
Epistemic norms, on this picture, simply reflect the force of epistemic reasons. 
The norm (FCE), one’s epistemic attitudes ought to fit the evidence, shows how 
epistemic reasons work; it is not a source of any additional epistemic reasons. (A welfarist holds that only effects on people’s welfare provide reasons for action. Welfare considerations determine in a certain way, let’s say in the maximizing way, what one ought to do. The resulting norm‚ maximize welfare, shows us how reasons work; this 
norm doesn’t provide any reasons in addition to welfare considerations.)  
 We have offered two answers to Littlejohn’s criticism of evidentialism. Either 
evidentialism accepts it’s own norm-reasons and can, thereby, handle the case of 
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2 We are grateful for valuable comments and discussions to Hannes Fraissler, Chris Kelp, 
and Susanne Mantel.  
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